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I. INTRODUCTION   
 
  
he conflicts in Syria have generated legal complexities unseen in modern 
history. More than one thousand organized armed groups1 and sixty States2 
are involved in myriad non-international armed conflicts—and possibly an 
international armed conflict—spread across Syria and Iraq. States have in-
voked individual self-defense, collective self-defense and humanitarian in-
tervention as the basis for their action, which has taken the form of air-
                                                                                                                      
 Major Christopher M. Ford, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, is a Military Pro-
fessor at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the United States Na-
val War College. Thanks to Michael N. Schmitt, Sasha Radin and Jason Coats for their 
advice and assistance on this article. The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the 
author and not necessarily of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or 
the U.S. Naval War College. 
1. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Intelligence Official Says Syrian War Could Last for 
Years, NEW YORK TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/ 
middleeast/us-intelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html (the U.S. De-
fense Intelligence Agency estimates as many as 1,200 groups).  
2. The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www. 













strikes, direct ground action and use of proxy forces as of early 2016. To 
this bloody mix, more than 10,000 foreign fighters have traveled to fight in 
the region.  
There have been innumerable war crimes,3 including the first State use 
of chemical weapons since 1988.4 The conflicts have further provided a 
fertile spawning ground for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),5 an 
organized armed group notable for its size (an estimated 19,000–25,000 
members),6 territorial control (controlling approximately 20,000 square 
miles of territory across those two States) and metastasization to other are-
as.7  
In order to examine the legal issues raised by the conflicts, the Stockton 
Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College 
and the Center for the Rule of Law at the U.S. Military Academy convened 
a three-day workshop in November 2015. This event brought together ac-
ademics; representatives from the United Nations, the International Com-
mittee for the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and States—the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada and the United States. Mem-
bers of U.S. government included representatives from the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, all branches of the U.S. Department of Defense, including 
U.S. Central Command, the unified component responsible for U.S. securi-
                                                                                                                      
3. See, in particular, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) [herein-
after Commission of Inquiry Report 1]; Report of the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012); 
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry 
Report 3]; Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Commission of In-
quiry Report 4]; Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Commission 
of Inquiry Report 5]. 
4. Commission of Inquiry Report 5, supra note 3, ¶ 139. 
5. This organization is referred to interchangeably as the Islamic State for Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State (IS) or by its Arabic acronym, Daesh. See Maria Vultaggio, 
ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh: What’s the Difference, IBT (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.ibtim 
es.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-2187131. 
6. CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & CARLA E. HUMUD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43612, THE ISLAMIC STATE AND U.S. POLICY (Feb. 9, 2016). 
7. Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/20150410_ISIL 
_Map_Unclass_Approved.pdf (last visited May 31, 2016) (figures in this release indicate 












ty interests in the Middle East. Attendees included four U.S. and allied gen-
eral officers and other senior policy advisors.  
The workshop sought to examine the question posed by its title: can in-
ternational law cope with the situation in Syria? It is a question that has 
ramifications for the viability of international law well beyond the confines 
of events in Syria. The intent of this report is to survey the key issues that 
were raised during the workshop and serve as an introduction to the arti-
cles that follow in this forum. 
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICTS IN SYRIA 
 
The conflicts find their origins in the brutal repression of anti-government 
protests in early 2011. Protests first occurred following the arrest (and al-
leged torture) in early March by the Syrian government of more than a 
dozen teenagers in Dar’a who had painted anti-regime messages on the 
their school’s wall.8 Within days, the Syrian government initiated a crack-
down with internal security forces.9 By late March the Syrian government 
had deployed the Fourth Armored Division, commanded by President Ba-
shar al Assad’s brother, to quell the protests.10 Throughout the spring of 
2011, the protests escalated rapidly in size and geographic dispersion11 and 
the number of opposition groups and their organization grew correspond-
ingly. The most prominent opposition group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), 
formed in a Turkish refugee camp that summer.12  
                                                                                                                      
8. Guide: Syria Crisis, BBC (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-13855203 (reporting fourteen students were arrested after painting the slogan “The 
people want the downfall of the regime”). 
9. UN Human Rights Council Calls for Investigation into Alleged Abuses in Syria, UN NEWS 
CENTER (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38237& 
(The Deputy High Commissioner for the Human Rights indicated that by the end of 
April, 2011 “[t]anks have been deployed and shelled densely-populated areas. The delivery 
of food has been impeded. Access to electricity has been cut. And transportation systems 
have been shut down. There have been reports of snipers firing on persons attempting to 
assist the injured or remove dead bodies from public areas.”). 
10. Guide: Syria Crisis, supra note 8. 
11. On March 25, for instance, more than 100,000 people protested in Dar’a. Dozens 
of Syrians Reported Killed in Darra, CNN (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WO 
RLD/meast/03/25/syria.unrest/.  
12. JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURI-














On September 12, the United Nations established the Commission of 
Inquiry with the mission “to investigate all alleged violations of interna-
tional human rights law . . . in . . . Syria[] . . . to establish the facts and cir-
cumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpe-
trated and, where possible, to identify those responsible . . . .”13 The Com-
mission has since issued a series of reports on the conflicts detailing the 
conduct of hostilities.14   
On August 3, the President of the Security Council issued a statement 
condemning the “widespread violations of human rights and the use of 
force against civilians by the Syrian authorities.”15 This did little to staunch 
the spread of violence in the country. By late fall, the Syria government was 
engaged in military operations in all major metropolitan areas.16 In Novem-
ber, the Arab League took the highly unusual step of suspending Syria’s 
membership, based on the government’s response to the protests.17  
In January 2012, al-Qaeda began operations in Syria as the al-Nusra 
Front (also known as al-Qaeda in the Levant or Jabhat al-Nusra).18 The 
                                                                                                                      
13. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Ar-
ab Republic, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2 (Aug. 22, 2011), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/169/88/PDF/G1116988.pdf?OpenElement. 
14. For a list of some Commission Reports, see supra note 3. For the Commission’s 
mandate, see Commission of Inquiry Report 1, supra note 3, ¶ 4 (“to investigate all alleged 
violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the 
crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of ensur-
ing that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against hu-
manity, are held accountable”). 
15. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/16 
(Aug. 3, 2011). 
16. Commission of Inquiry Report 1, supra note 3, ¶ 39. 
17. Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-
league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?_r=0. (Eighteen of 
the twenty-two members voted to suspend their membership. Only Yemen and Lebanon 
opposed the action). See also Commission of Inquiry Report 1, supra note 3, Summary & ¶ 
8 (Noting that in November the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights had found that 3,500 civilians had been killed by State forces since March, 
2011. The Commission report found “[t]he substantial body of evidence gathered by the 
commission indicates that . . . gross violations of human rights have been committed by 
Syrian military and security forces since the beginning of the protests.”). 
18. Despite their affiliation with al-Qaeda the focus of this group thus far has been on 
Assad rather than the West. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has specifically directed 
the al-Nusra Front to concentrate operations on Syria and cease operations against the 












violence intensified dramatically during the spring and summer of 2012. 
The Commission found the existence of a non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) in its third report, released on August 16.19 This report also docu-
mented numerous war crimes committed by pro-government militias (the 
Shabbiha).20  
In November, the opposition forces convened in Turkey for a confer-
ence to further organize themselves.21 The groups established a thirty-
person council (the Supreme Military Council) charged with coordinating 
all military opposition forces in Syria.22 
Hezbollah23 and ISIS began operations in Syria in early 2013.24 The Syr-
ian government first used chemical weapons during this period of time.25 
From 2013 through late summer 2014, the scale of violence remained 
broadly constant. The United States began airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria 
                                                                                                                      
Identity, THE WORLD REPORT (May 31, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-
lister/an-internal-struggle-al-q_b_7479730.html. 
19. Commission of Inquiry Report 3, supra note 3, ¶ 3.  
20. Id., ¶¶ 59, 83, 85, 88, 101, 112, 126–29, 156. 
21. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECU-
RITY REPORT 5: THE FREE SYRIAN ARMY, (2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/si 
tes/default/files/The-Free-Syrian-Army-24MAR.pdf. See also Statement on the Formation of 
the Supreme Military Council Command of Syria, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATION-
AL PEACE, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50445 (last visited May 4, 
2016). 
22. O’BAGY, supra note 21, at 9; Statement on the Formation of the Supreme Military Council 
Command, supra note 21. 
23. Commission of Inquiry Report 4, supra note 3, at ¶ 24. See also MARISA SULLIVAN, 
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 19: HEZBOLLAH 
IN SYRIA (2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sulliva 
n_FINAL.pdf. 
24. Umberto Bacchi, ISIS: Timeline of the Islamic State, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-timeline-islamic-state-1508465. 
25. Commission of Inquiry Report 5, supra note 3, at ¶ 139 (reports on chemical 
weapons use in Khan Al-Asal (Aleppo) on 19 March, Uteibah (Damascus) on 19 March, 













in September 21, 2014.26 Russian airstrikes in Syria began a year later in 
September 2015.27 
As of May 2016, a ceasefire was in place in Syria. The ceasefire was ne-
gotiated by the United States and Russia as co-chairs of the “International 
Syria Support Group.”28 United Nations-sponsored peace talks chaired by 
the U.N. Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, are being held in Ge-
neva between opposition forces and the Syrian government as this is writ-
ten.29  
 
III. SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES DISCUSSED AT THE WORKSHOP  
 
The international law issues presented by the conflicts in Syria are complex 
and broad ranging, spanning the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as well as other 
bodies of law including domestic law, human rights law and refugee law.  
The complexity of the issue demanded robust framing. To that end, the 
workshop opened with an overview of the geopolitical history of the re-
gion. A later session explored the attitude of ISIS to various international 
law issues encountered in the workshop. That discussion focused on the 
ideology of ISIS—an ideology deeply rooted in their reading of Islamic 
theology and jurisprudence but inimical towards more mainstream Islamic 
theology. Importantly, the ISIS view of Islam rejects the modern system of 
international law.   
Given the scale of the conflicts (more than sixty States participating in 
some aspect of the conflicts), perhaps the most fundamental issues are 
those concerning use of force. The first legal block of the workshop ad-
dressed these issues. After reviewing the legal framework—Article 2(4) of 
                                                                                                                      
26. Helene Cooper & Eric Schmitt, Airstrikes by U.S. and Allies Hit ISIS Targets in Syria, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/ mid-
dleeast/us-and-allies-hit-isis-targets-in-syria.html. See generally Operation Inherent Response: 
Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://www. 
defense. gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve (last visited May 9, 2016). 
27. Patrick J. McDonnell, W.J. Hennigan & Nabih Bulos, Russia Launches Airstrikes in 
Syria Amid U.S. Concern about Targets, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www. 
latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-kremlin-oks-troops-20150930-story.html. 
28. Statement of the International Syria Support Group, EEAS (Nov. 14, 2015) http:// 
eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151114_03_en.htm.  
29. Karen Zraick, Syria Talks Are Complicated by Competing Opposition Groups, N.Y. 













the UN Charter30 and its exceptions31—discussion turned to the specific 
facts presented by the conflicts in Syria. The use of force was considered in 
several broad categories: support to Syrian rebel groups, military support to 
the Syrian government and operations against ISIS.  
Participants addressed the legal ramifications which flow from third-
party support to rebel groups. One issue considered was whether U.S. pro-
grams supporting rebels could trigger the armed attack threshold. This 
analysis centered on the International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua decision 
and the gap viewed by many to exist between Article 2(4) and Article 51.32 
It was noted that if one accepts the existence of a gap this could prevent 
the victim State from acting in self-defense because the support to rebel 
groups, while amounting to a use of force under 2(4), would not constitute 
an armed attack. A number of participants agreed that U.S. support had 
not triggered Syria’s right to self-defense, thus appropriate responses from 
Syria would be limited to non-forcible countermeasures.33 
Discussion turned to the concept of “unable or unwilling” as a grounds 
for justifying the use of force in circumstances where a State fails to pre-
vent its territory from being used by a third party to mount an attack 
against another State.34 This argument has been explicitly endorsed by Aus-
                                                                                                                      
30. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” See also Armed Activities on the Territo-
ry of Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 35 (Dec. 19). 
31. There are two Charter-based exceptions—Security Council action pursuant to Ar-
ticle 39 and 42 and self-defense pursuant to Article 51. Other exceptions include consent 
and (arguably) humanitarian intervention. 
32. On the gap between these two articles, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 190 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicara-
gua]. 
33. On non-forcible countermeasures, see generally SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS 
LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNA-
TIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 150–51, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25, U.N. Sales No. 
E.12.V.12 (2012) (2012). 
34. The United States has argued that it may act in self-defense in another State where 
that State is “unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.” Per-
manent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated September 23, 
2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014). For an excel-
lent and comprehensive article on the “unwilling or unable” test, see Ashley S. Deeks, 
“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIR-
GINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2012). On State responsibility, see Draft 













tralia35 and Turkey,36 and implicitly endorsed by the United Kingdom,37 
France38 and Iraq.39 It was noted that some alternatives to “unwilling or 
                                                                                                                      
the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2) (“Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State pre-
cludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act 
remains within the limits of that consent.”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
369 (2d ed. 2005) (“by express consent a State may authorize the use of force on its terri-
tory whenever, being the object of an ‘armed attack,’ it resorts to individual self-defense 
and in addition authorizes a third State to assist in ‘collective self-defense’”). 
35. Permanent Rep. of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated September 9, 2015 from 
the Permanent Rep. of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) (“The Government of Syria has, 
by its failure to constrain attacks upon Iraqi territory originating from ISIL bases within 
Syria, demonstrated that it is unwilling or unable to prevent those attacks. In response to 
the request for assistance by the Government of Iraq, Australia is therefore undertaking 
necessary and proportionate military operations against ISIL in Syria in the exercise of the 
collective self-defence of Iraq.”). 
36. Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dat-
ed July 24, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) (“It is apparent that the regime in Syria is neither capable of 
nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its territory, which clearly imperil the 
security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals. Individual and collective self-defence is 
our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”). 
37. Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to 
the U.N., Identical letters dated November 25, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed 
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2014/851 (Nov. 25, 2014) (“[T]he United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land is taking measures in support of the collective self-defence of Iraq . . . by striking 
ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria, as necessary and proportionate measures.”). 
See also 20 July 2015, Parl Deb. HC (2015) col. 1236 (UK), http://www.publications. par-
liament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150720/debtext/150720-0001.htm (Statement by 
Michael Fallon, “Actions by American, Canadian and other forces in Syria are legal be-
cause they contribute to the collective self-defence of the legitimate Government of Iraq 
where the Government of Syria are unwilling and unable to deal with ISIL at its source in 
northern Syria.”). 
38. Permanent Rep. of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated September 8, 2015 
from the Permanent Rep. of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745 (Sept. 8, 2015) 












unable” include the concepts of “harbor and support” and “ungoverned 
spaces.”40 Finally, discussion addressed U.S. actions against the al-Nusra 
Front.  
The next block examined conflict classification in Syria. A number of 
participants agreed that there were at least three broad categories of NIACs 
in Syria: (1) those between various opposition groups and the Syrian gov-
ernment and Russia; (2) those between various States and ISIS; and (3) 
those between opposition groups fighting among themselves. Some partic-
ipants also maintained that there exists a NIAC between Turkey and the 
Syrian Kurds, and a NIAC between the United States and al Nusra. Fur-
ther, one participant argued that there was a brief international armed con-
flict between Turkey and Russia arising from the Turkish shoot down of 
the Russian aircraft.  
Discussion in this section considered the date on which a NIAC first 
existed.41 Participants recalled first the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia’s Tadić test which requires “protracted armed vio-
lence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
                                                                                                                      
actions involving the participation of military aircraft in response to attacks carried out by 
ISIL from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.”). 
39. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated September 20, 2014 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/691 (Sept. 20, 2014) (“ISIL has established a safe haven out-
side Iraq’s borders that is a direct threat to the security of our people and territory. . . . The 
presence of this safe haven has made our borders impossible to defend and exposed our 
citizens to the threat of terrorist attacks. It is for these reasons that we, in accordance with 
international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements, and with due re-
gard for complete national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested the United 
States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, 
with our express consent.”). 
40. On these concepts, see generally Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force against Non-State 
Actors: The State of Play, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (2015). 
41. NIACs are governed by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, 
where applicable, 1977 Additional Protocol I. Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [[hereinafter GC III]; Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 













between such groups within a State.”42 Of particular interest was the inten-
sity criterion of the test.43 The group addressed the question of whether the 
intensity of violence needed to be separately calculated between each party 
to the conflict, or whether the general level of intensity of violence in Syria 
sufficed to incorporate other organized armed groups that may themselves 
carry out only minor acts of violence. One participant asked whether the 
intensity criteria could be entirely satisfied by violence conducted by only 
one party to the conflict. This could occur if, for instance, the Syrian gov-
ernment carried out significant acts of violence against an organized armed 
group, but the group did not respond with violence.  
Discussion then turned to the geographic applicability of Common Ar-
ticle 344 and the customary law of armed conflict (LOAC) in a NIAC. Some 
participants argued that LOAC applies in the territory of a State into which 
the conflict has “spilled over.”45 Others argued to the contrary, noting that 
there are two alternatives: conflict follows the person or conflict is limited 
to the territory of the State.46 Despite some disagreement on this topic, 
many considered that the question of whether or not LOAC applies in 
spill-over conflicts is particularly relevant for determining the law applica-
ble to detention operations and post-conflict prosecutions.  
                                                                                                                      
42. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995). 
43. The intensity criterion is widely accepted to encompass both temporal and a gravi-
ty elements. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).  
44. GC I–IV, supra note 41, art. 3. 
45. For the view that LOAC applies to spill-over conflicts, see INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS, Report Prepared for the 31st Internation-
al Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 31IC/11/5.1.2, 9–11 (Oct. 2011); Jele-
na Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 189, 194 (2011) (“[C]ertain NIACs originating within the 
territory of a single state between government armed forces and one or more organized 
armed groups have also been known to ‘spill over’ into the territory of neighbouring 
states. Leaving aside other legal issues that may be raised by the incursion of foreign 
armed forces into neighbouring territory (violations of sovereignty and possible reactions 
of the armed forces of the adjacent state that could turn the fighting into an international 
armed conflict), it is submitted that the relations between parties whose conflict has spilled 
over remain at a minimum governed by Common Article 3 and customary IHL.”). 
46. For the view that a conflict follows the parties to that conflict, see generally Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INTER-












The second day of the workshop opened with a presentation on the is-
sue of arming, training and employing proxies in Syria. The use of proxies 
implicates the principle of non-intervention;47 the prohibition on the use of 
force;48 State responsibility;49 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conven-
tions, which requires “[p]arties undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for the present Convention in all circumstances;”50 and the territorial 
State’s right of self-defense. These issues raised the policy question of what 
steps could be taken by a government to ensure the proxy force complies 
with LOAC. Some of the suggestions included:  
 
 Ensuring the leaders of the proxy group have sufficient control 
over their subordinates in order to ensure compliance with LOAC;  
 Directing assistance away from entities within the proxy force that 
are likely to commit—or have previously committed—LOAC vio-
lations; 
 Training the proxy force in LOAC compliance; and 
 Conditioning support on compliance with LOAC and then moni-
toring proxy implementation.  
 
The next topic addressed was the legal implications arising from the 
presence of foreign fighters, as well as various States’ approaches to im-
plementing Security Council Resolutions 217051 and 2178.52 The discussion 
here focused on pragmatic issues faced by States: where is the line between 
incitement to violence and freedom of expression in developing national 
legislation, what is “terrorist intent” within the meaning of the Security 
Council resolutions53 and when is an act considered to be terrorism and not 
                                                                                                                      
47. Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 202. See also Armed Activities, supra note 30,  ¶ 205  (The 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua found “the principle forbids all States or groups 
of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States.”). 
48. Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 228 (“arming and training” rebels “can certainly be said 
to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua”). 
49. Id., ¶¶ 109, 115 (The sponsoring State may be liable for the actions of the proxy 
where the proxy is acting on behalf of the sponsor or where the sponsoring State has ef-
fective control over the proxy.). 
50. GC I–IV, supra note 41, art. 1. 
51. S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
52. S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014). 














just a criminal offense. The discussion of these issues focused on specific 
questions, e.g., in the context of foreign fighters, the role of social media 
and the presence of recruiters who encourage foreign fighter participation 
and international criminal culpability for acts relating to foreign fighters. 
With regard to the latter question, at least one participant expressed a belief 
that that the Rome Statute54 provides jurisdiction over foreign fighters who 
are nationals of States party. 
The participants then addressed the law governing the conduct of hos-
tilities in Syria. The prominence of customary law applicable in NIACs as 
the most relevant legal regime and the dearth in treaty law (largely limited 
to Common Article 3) were highlighted. There was discussion on the 
methods of warfare employed by the parties to the various conflicts.55 The 
use of human shields generally was extensively discussed, particularly in 
light of the U.S. position set out in the Department of Defense’s Law of 
War Manual.56 Opinions reflected all three positions in the debate: (1) all 
human shields (involuntary or voluntary) should be protected as civilians 
for the purposes of targeting; (2) voluntary human shields are directly par-
ticipating in hostilities and thus lose their protected status and are subject 
to direct attack; and (3) human shields, while not directly targetable, may be 
disregarded in the proportionality calculation. Some proponents of the sec-
                                                                                                                      
criminal attacks . . . committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a popula-
tion or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act, and all other acts which constitute offences within the scope 
of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to ter-
rorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls 
upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts 
are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. 
 
S. C. Res. 1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
54. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 12(2)(b), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
55. An extensive catalogue of the methods and means of hostilities employed in Syria 
can be found in the U.N Independent International Commission of Inquiry reports, supra 
note 3. 
56. For a discussion on the issue of human shields in the DoD Law of War Manual, see 
Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and Proportionality in the DoD Manual, 92 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 31 (2016) (discussing proportionality and human shields 












ond and third positions argued that allowing an adversary to take advantage 
of human shields would encourage their use. 
The group next considered war crimes in Syria. It was pointed out 
again, and acknowledged by a number of participants, that only Common 
Article 3 and customary international law apply as Syria is not a party to 
Additional Protocol II. Various mechanisms for accountability were ad-
dressed including the International Criminal Court (ICC),57 domestic pros-
ecutions and ad-hoc international or hybrid tribunals. There was discussion 
regarding the possibility of Security Council referral under Article 13(b) of 
the Rome Statute.58 Notwithstanding a possible referral, there remained 
open the question of whether or not the ICC would have jurisdiction over 




The conflicts in Syria present a situation of unprecedented complexity for 
modern international law. Indeed, one might consider the situation in Syria 
a real-world case study in the huge diversity of legal issues that may sur-
round an armed conflict. Unfortunately, although unsurprisingly, the work-
shop did not result in a solution, or even consensus. 
At best, perhaps, one can hope for post-conflict accountability. It may 
be that the most important question arising from this conflict is not the 
number of NIACs or the exact date when IHL applied or whether the ICC 
has jurisdiction over the use of chemical weapons, but rather whether the 
present system of international law can effectively regulate a modern con-
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